Archive for the ‘Pricing Strategy’ Category

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The Ultimate In Customer-Driven Pricing

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2007


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Rock band Radiohead have just announced that their new album will be released as a digital download with the fans being able to decide how much they pay for it. The band currently have no record label and as such, have no overheads in releasing the album – therefore every penny paid by the buyer goes straight to the band.

So far the NME website reports that people having been paying an average of £5 per album, meaning that the consumer is paying much less than they would normally pay in a traditional release. In addition to this, the fans know that all the money is going straight to the recording artist as opposed to the majority of it going to the record label big-wigs.

Have Radiohead kick-started a new trend? Can this kind of pricing be applied to other industries other than the music industry? Leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

An article on the Church of the Customer blog looks at this story in more detail – see below. For more information on pricing take a loook at our white paper – “The Problem With Price”.

A few years ago, we wrote an essay for Seth’s “Big Moo” on what the world might be like if technology and globalization overwhelmingly drove a significant number of prices to their ultimate price point: free.

Our scenario: what if “suggested retail price” disappeared, along with your ability to set prices?
Or, what if you allowed the marketplace to name its own price without negotiation?

The British band Radiohead is trying scenario two with its new album. On this website, you add the album to your cart; when you check out, you type in how much you’ll pay. That’s it. No argument, no negotiation.

You pay a buck to handle the credit card fee (alas, intermediaries always get paid), but it’s a cool experiment in economics for a band known for risk-taking.
For producers of digital content, I argue this isn’t much of an economic risk at all. The replication cost of digital files is basically zero. Radiohead has spent years cultivating a cult following, so the band has already reaped a handsome return based on the worldwide attention they’ve accumulated with this product-release strategy.

Of more benefit to them now is building a database of buyers, bypassing the information black hole of so many retail channels. That’s the value exchange.

And in a few months, Radiohead will partner with a label, which will manufacture a CD of the album. If the album is great (always a non-quantitative variable when it comes to art), it will have already created demand for the totem version of the album.

If scarcity isn’t your primary method for generating demand, then getting your product or service into as many hands, mouths and minds possible is. The ideas, products or services that spread the most usually win.

Today and more so tomorrow, that means letting go of the control you’re accustomed to.



Jumping on the bandwagon… or shunting it off the road?

Thursday, June 14th, 2007


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With the launch of Apple’s much mooted iPhone on the horizon, many leading phone manufacturers are rallying together to try and proactively take a lead… or is it just a reactive damage limitation exercise? Can the might of the iPhone brand and all the hype surrounding it take on an entire industry? Only time will tell.

The article below, from the Financial Times has all the details.

Mobile phone groups take on iPhone
By Maija Palmer in London
Published: June 13 2007 22:02 | Last updated: June 13 2007 22:02

The mobile phone industry will on Thursday launch a challenge to Apple’s iPhone, by unveiling a low-cost, flat-rate music service that can be accessed on most handsets in Europe and Asia.

The MusicStation service has backing from the handset manufacturers Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Motorola and Samsung and 30 mobile phone operators and all four music majors – Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, EMI Music and Warner Music International – as well as several independent labels.

Music companies are hoping that MusicStation will help kick-start mass-market consumption of music over mobile phones.

The service launches just ahead of Apple’s iPhone debut in the US on June 29. The iPhone will give users easy access to Apple’s iTunes online music store, building on the success of the company’s popular iPod portable music player.

“We were keen to jump through the finish line first,� said Rob Lewis, chief executive of Omnifone, the privately-owned UK start-up company behind the MusicStation service. “All European and Asian consumers will have access to MusicStation well before iPhone’s arrival in those regions.�

Telenor, the Scandinavian operator, will be the first to launch the service in Sweden, but it is expected to be rolled out throughout Europe, Asia and Africa over the next few months.

Manufacturers will begin producing handsets that have been pre-loaded with software to access MusicStation. Many of these devices will be mid-priced, in contrast to the iPhone, which will have a price tag of about $499. It is estimated that 100m MusicStation-enabled handsets will be sold over the next 12 months, dwarfing the 10m iPhone handsets Apple aims to ship in the next year.

The industry estimates that mobile music consumers on average download just six songs a year, at a typical price of £1 (€1.48) a song.

Music groups stand to increase their earnings significantly by taking a share of the weekly €2.99 flat fee that MusicStation charges consumers for unlimited access to a catalogue of more than 1m songs. The fee includes all downloading charges.

Users will be able to listen to the songs and store them on the phone, but not burn them on to CD or distribute them over the internet.



Pricing And The Three Humps

Tuesday, June 12th, 2007


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There was a very interesting post from Seth Godin on his blog at the end of last week. In the post, Godin suggests that there are three main ‘humps’ that result from different pricing strategy. The post is below, so let us know what you think of it (or you can click here to view the post on Godin’s blog). If you want more information on pricing why not have a read of our white paper “The problem with price”.

I’ve been working on a video project and thinking about pricing. That led me to this chart, which is more conceptual than accurate.

Let’s go through it, starting with the stick on the left.

FREE stuff spreads. You don’t make any money from the thing you’re giving away, but you do get attention, which is worth as much, or more in many cases.

Charge even a penny, though, and the drop off is huge.

Jump over to the middle hump, the one without the question mark.

REASONABLE PRICING puts you right in the middle of the market. With reasonable pricing, you can move just a bit to the left or the right to find the sweet spot, the spot where you can balance money for promotion or shelf space or advertising against keeping your price low. Most of us are familiar with the shape of this curve in our industry. For example, hardcover books go for about $21. At $28, you have more money for co-op and ads, but sales go down a bit. At $19, you can’t promote much, but sales go up a bit.

Move a bit to the left to the first hump with a question mark.

REALLY LOW PRICING is a whole new world. That’s when something becomes cheap enough to be irresistible to someone who might not consider the category at all. This is what happens when MP3 songs go from 99 cents to 20 cents. This is what happens when you sell a hardcover book for $10. There’s no room for big promotion, at least at first, but as WalMart has shown us, you can get scale at the super low end and have plenty of profit left over to hire fancy PR firms and lobbyists and ad agencies.

The last hump, the one on the right, is usually unexplored.

REALLY HIGH PRICING is the domain of specialty markets and superstars. Elton John gets $300,000 to do a bar mitzvah. John Cleese offers training videos that cost $1000 for one DVD. This is the land of high service and extreme exclusivity.

What’s interesting about the four choices is that most organizations are only familiar with one. Ask them to try another and they freak out. They don’t even want to consider it.

I think real growth can come when you get out of your comfort hump and create a blend. Understanding how to live in multiple worlds and to balance them isn’t obvious, but the opportunities are worth it. Ben Zander’s brilliant book costs $10.20 at Amazon in hardcover. Buying the DVD costs $1495.00.

If he wanted to sell the DVD in large quantities, he’d need to price it differently and sell it in a different channel. But if he wants to work with trainers and the distributors who sell to them, he’s exactly in the center of that third hump.

Careful about the Y axis (volume). Units aren’t always the goal. (that’s why I said this chart was conceptual). FREE gets you the most units, REALLY EXPENSIVE the least. But depending on your objectives, units might not be the point.

It’s not important to know the right answer, which hump to choose, because there isn’t one. It”s essential to know the question, because there are four distinct choices, and not choosing is still choosing.



Go Figure – Pricing & Segmentation – Part 4 of 4

Wednesday, May 30th, 2007


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Pricing and Segmentation

Here is the fourth and final part of Tim Harford’s fantastic article on pricing and segmentation.

Perhaps you are a company director rubbing your hands with glee as you read this, planning to deploy a range of clever price-targeting strategies in your own business. Before you get too excited, you’ll need to deal with the leaks in your price-targeting system. There are two potentially catastrophic leaks or great holes in an otherwise brilliant marketing scheme. If you don’t deal with them, your plans will be in ruins.

The first problem is that supposedly price-insensitive customers may not play the self-targeting game. It’s not hard to persuade price-sensitive customers to steer clear of an expensive product, but sometimes it is more difficult to prevent the price-insensitive customers from buying the cheaper one. This is not a problem in the case of small price differences; we have already seen that you can get some customers to pay a modest mark-up in absolute terms, but the mark-up can be huge in relative terms.

Some of the most extreme examples come from the transport industry: travelling first class by rail or air is much more expensive than buying a standard ticket, but since the fundamental effect is to get people from A to B, it may be hard to wring much money out of the wealthier passengers. In order to price-target effectively, companies may have to exaggerate the differences between the best service and the worst. There is no reason why standard-class railway carriages shouldn’t have tables, for instance, except that potential first-class customers might decide to buy a cheaper ticket when they see how comfortable standard class has become. So the standard-class passengers have to do without.

The 19th-century French economist Emile Dupuit pointed to the early railways as an example: “It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third- class carriage or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches… What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich… And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second- class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class customers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.”

Customer Service On A Train

The shoddy quality of most airport departure lounges across the world is surely part of the same phenomenon. If the free departure lounges became comfortable, then airlines would no longer be able to sell business-class tickets on the strength of their “executive” lounges. And it would also explain why flight attendants sometimes physically restrain passengers from the cheap seats from stepping off the plane before the passengers from first and business class. This is a “service” aimed not at economy-class passengers but at those looking on in pity and disgust from the front of the plane. The message is clear: keep paying for your expensive seats, or next time you might be on the wrong side of the flight attendant.

In the supermarkets, we see the same trick: products that seem to be packaged for the express purpose of conveying awful quality. Supermarkets will often produce an own-brand “value” range, displaying crude designs that don’t vary whether the product is lemonade or bread or baked beans. It wouldn’t cost much to hire a good designer and print more attractive logos. But that would defeat the object: the packaging is carefully designed to put off customers who are willing to pay more. Even customers who would be willing to pay five times as much for a bottle of lemonade will buy the bargain product unless the supermarket makes some effort to discourage them. So, like the lack of tables in standard-class railway carriages and the uncomfortable seats in airport lounges, the ugly packaging of “value” products is designed to make sure that snooty customers self-target price increases on themselves.

Consider a hypothetical organisation, TrainCorp, a passenger train company. TrainCorp owns a train that always travels full. Some of the seats go at a discount of £50 to leisure travellers who booked in advance, to senior citizens, to students or to families. The other tickets cost the full price of £100 and are bought by commuters and other business travellers. This is a fairly standard group-targeting strategy: by giving away a few low-price tickets, TrainCorp restricts supply and acquires the ability to demand high prices by offering tickets to only the buyers with the highest willingness to pay. (It might be profitable for TrainCorp just to fence off some of the seats and restrict supply that way, but it’s even better for them to fill the spare seats if they can.)

We know at once – if we are economists – that this is inefficient. In other words, we can think of something that would make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.

That something is to find a commuter who was willing to pay a little less than £100, say £95, and who decided to travel by car instead, and offer him a seat for £90. Where does the seat come from, since the train is full? Well, you take a student who is in no great hurry and was willing to pay a little more than £50, say £55, for the seat and politely throw him off the train. But you refund the price of his ticket, plus an extra £10 for his trouble.

Where do we stand now? The comuter was willing to pay £95 but only paid £90. He’s better off by £5. The student was willing to pay £55 for a £50 ticket, so if he’d been allowed to ride, he’d have been only £5 better off. But he has just been given £10, so the student is also happy. And what about TrainCorp? Well, TrainCorp just transformed a £50 ticket into a £90 ticket and made a more profitable sale. Even after paying £10 compensation to the student, the company is £30 ahead. Now everyone’s a winner; or they would be if TrainCorp adopted this system instead of its group price- targeting strategy. But of course, that’s not what happens, because if TrainCorp tried it, commuters who were willing to pay £100 would hang around for the £90 tickets, and students who weren’t willing to pay £50 would buy tickets anyway and wait to be paid to get off. The whole affair would turn out badly for TrainCorp, who is the one who gets to set the prices.

In case your head is spinning a little, here’s the quick-and-dirty summary: the group price-targeting strategy is inefficient because it takes seats away from customers who are willing to pay more, and gives them to customers who are willing to pay less. Yet airlines and railways still use it, because the alternative of individual price-targeting isn’t feasible.

OK, so sometimes price-targeting is less efficient than a uniform price; sometimes it’s more efficient than a uniform price. But we can say more than that. Whenever price-targeting fails to expand the number of sales and merely moves products from people who value them more, like commuters, to people who value them less, like students, as in the case of TrainCorp, it will definitely be less efficient than a uniform price. Whenever price-targeting opens up a new market without affecting the old market, it will definitely be more efficient than a uniform price.

And there’s a middle position. A lot of group price-targeting does a bit of both: it opens up some new markets but also wastefully moves products away from high-value users to low-value users. For example, my book, The Undercover Economist, is published in hardcover at a high price, and the paperback edition emerges later, at a lower price. The aim is to target a higher price at people impatient to hear what I have to say and at libraries. One good result is that the publisher will be able to sell paperbacks more cheaply, because some costs will be offset by the hardcover sales, and so the book will reach more people. One bad result is that the early version is much more expensive than it would be if there was only a single paperback edition, and some buyers will be put off. That’s what life is like in a world of scarcity: when companies with scarcity power try to exploit it, the situation will almost always be inefficient, and – equivalently – we economists will almost always be able to think of something better.

Undercover Economist

This is an edited extract from “The Undercover Economist” to be published in the US on November 1 (Oxford University Press $26) and in the UK on March 2 2006 (Little, Brown £17.99). cTim Harford 2005.



Go Figure – Pricing & Segmentation – Part 3 of 4

Friday, May 25th, 2007


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Part 3 of Tim Harford’s article on pricing and segmentation. The 4th and final part will be published next week.

Supermarkets have turned price targeting into an art, developing a vast array of strategies to that end. Above the main concourse of Liverpool Street station, there’s a Marks and Spencer “Simply Food” store, catering for busy commuters on the way in and out of London. Knowing what we do about scarcity value, we shouldn’t be surprised to find that this shop isn’t cheap – even compared with another branch of M&S merely 500 metres or so away, at Moorgate.

I picked up five products at random in the Liverpool Street store and managed to locate four of them in the Moorgate store. Every single one was about 15 per cent cheaper there. Big salads were down from £3.50 to £3.00, sandwiches from £2.20 to £1.90. But even when such discrepancies come to light, few City workers would be willing to stray that distance to save 30p. A bold and effective piece of price-targeting.

The distance between Liverpool St. and Moorgate

Other supermarkets are more circumspect about their pricing policy. Going undercover once again, I made a comparison between the smallish Sainsbury’s supermarket in Tottenham Court Road, and the large store in Dalston, one of east London’s less prosperous neighbourhoods. It was harder to find examples of identical products selling for different prices, although by no means impossible. Does this mean that Sainsbury’s doesn’t price-target as much as M&S? Not at all. They simply go about the whole process with more finesse.

When researching Sainsbury’s, my approach was the same as with M&S: walk into the shop and see what caught my eye. As you probably know, what catches our eye as we walk into the supermarket is no coincidence; it’s the result of careful planning designed to throw attractive but profitable products in the path of customers. What constitutes an attractive product depends on who those customers are. In Tottenham Court Road the obvious goods were all quite expensive: Tropicana orange juice at £1.95 a litre, Tropicana “Smoothies” at £1.99 for 100ml, Vittel mineral water at 80p for 750ml, and so on. It wasn’t that these products were more expensive in Tottenham Court Road than in Dalston (only the Vittel was), it was just that in Dalston cheaper substitutes sprang into view far more readily.

For instance, I couldn’t find inexpensive orange juice in the Tottenham Court Road store, but in Dalston, Sainsbury’s own brand of fresh chilled juice was sitting next to the Tropicana at about half the price, and the concentrated juice was almost six times cheaper than the Tropicana. Brand-name pasta was the same price in both shops, but only in Dalston was it sitting next to Sainsbury’s pasta, which again was almost six times cheaper. The effect was to target the whole Tottenham Court Road store at shoppers who are indifferent to prices, but to aim the Dalston stores at shoppers with a keener eye for a bargain – while of course giving any price- blind Dalston shoppers plenty of opportunity to show their true colours.

Another very common pricing strategy is sale pricing. We’re all so used to seeing a store-wide sale with hundreds of items reduced in price that we don’t pause and ask ourselves why on earth shops do this. When you think hard about it, it becomes quite a puzzling way of setting prices. The effect of a sale is to lower the average price a shop charges. But why knock 30 per cent off many of your prices twice a year, when you could knock 5 per cent off year- round? Varying prices is a lot of hassle for shops because they need to change their labels and their advertising, so why does it make sense for them to go to the trouble of mixing things up?

One explanation is that sales are an effective form of self- targeting. If some customers shop around for a good deal and some customers do not, it’s best for stores to have either high prices to prise cash from the loyal (or lazy) customers, or low prices to win business from the bargain-hunters. Middle-of-the-road prices are no good: not high enough to exploit loyal customers, not low enough to attract the bargain-hunters. But that’s not the end of the story, because if prices were stable then surely even the most price-insensitive customers would learn where to get particular goods cheaply. So rather than stick to either high or low prices, shops jump between the two extremes.

One common situation is for two supermarkets to be competing for the same customers. As we’ve discussed, it’s hard for one to be systematically more expensive than the other without losing a lot of business, so they will charge similar prices on average, but both will also mix up their prices. That way, both can distinguish the bargain hunters from those in need of specific products, such as people shopping to pick up ingredients for a recipe they are making for a dinner party. Bargain-hunters will pick up whatever is on sale and make something of it. The dinner-party shoppers came to the supermarket to buy specific products and will be less sensitive to prices. The price-targeting strategy only works because the supermarkets always vary the patterns of their special offers, and because it is too much trouble to go to both stores. If shoppers could reliably predict what was to be discounted, they could choose recipes ahead of time, and even choose the appropriate supermarket to pick up the ingredients wherever they’re least expensive.

In fact, it is just as accurate, and more illuminating, to turn the “sale” on its head and view prices as premiums on the sale price rather than discounts on the regular price. The random pattern of sales is also a random pattern of price increases – companies find it more profitable to increase prices (above the sale price) by a larger amount on an unpredictable basis than by a small amount in a predictable way. Customers find it troublesome to avoid unpredictable price increases – and may not even notice them for lower-value goods – but easy to avoid predictable ones.

Chilli Pepper

Try to spot other odd mix-ups next time you’re in the supermarket. Have you noticed that supermarkets often charge 10 times as much for fresh chilli peppers in a packet as for loose fresh chillies? That’s because the typical customer buys such small quantities that he doesn’t think to check whether they cost 4p or 40p. Randomly tripling the price of a vegetable is a favourite trick: customers who notice the mark-up just buy a different vegetable that week; customers who don’t have self-targeted a whopping price rise. I once spotted a particularly inspired trick while on a search for crisps. My favourite brand was available on the top shelf in salt and pepper flavour and on the bottom shelf, just a few feet away, in other flavours, all the same size. The top shelf crisps cost 25 per cent more, and customers who reached for the top shelf demonstrated that they hadn’t made a price-comparison between two near-identical products in near-identical locations. They were more interested in snacking.



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